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The criminal justice process typically begins when the police make a war-
rantless arrest. Although police usually do a good job of bringing in the
“right” cases, they do make mistakes. Officers sometimes arrest suspects even
though there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the crime. Police
also conduct unlawful searches and interrogations. And officers make arrests
in marginal cases—schoolyard fights are a good example—in which prosecu-
tors do not think a criminal conviction is appropriate. Accordingly, prosecu-
tors regularly dismiss cases after police have made warrantless arrests and
suspects have sat in jail for days, or even weeks. In a functioning criminal
justice system, we should expect prosecutors to use dismissals as “teachable
moments” for the police so that officers can avoid making incorrect and un-
necessary arrests in the future. Yet, as this Essay documents, prosecutors do
not always notify police about the errors that led to their cases being
dismissed.
This Essay proposes that prosecutors inform police officers that their
cases were dismissed and of the reasons for the dismissal. This information
will educate police officers about the elements of crimes in the penal code, the
realities about which cases are difficult for prosecutors to prove, and the
charging policies of the prosecutor’s office. Dismissal information will enable
police officers to better decide when to make warrantless arrests, and it should
reduce the number of weak cases that are input into the criminal justice system
in the first place. In turn, reducing case inputs will benefit overburdened crimi-
nal justice actors—prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and court staff—by
enabling them to spend more time on cases that will not be dismissed outright.
And having police avoid unnecessary arrests will benefit defendants by avoid-
ing needless incarceration and the cascade of other repercussions that follow
an arrest.
This Essay also proposes that prosecutors—particularly in large offices—
create a dismissal database that will identify problem officers who repeatedly
bring in weak cases that have to be dismissed. Prosecutors can then recom-
mend that police departments provide further training to those officers. A
database might also limit the moral-hazard problem of police being judged
only on their arrests, rather than on case resolutions. Finally, prosecutors
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should embrace this proposal because a dismissal database would not dramat-
ically increase the amount of Brady evidence prosecutors would be required to
disclose.
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INTRODUCTION
Police officers make the initial inputs into the criminal justice sys-
tem, and they make a lot of them. Although a small percentage of
cases begin with grand jury indictments or arrest warrants guided by
prosecutors, the vast majority of arrests are not planned in advance.1
Police observe what they believe is criminal conduct, and the officers
make the decision on the spot whether to arrest the individual. Al-
though prosecutors are regularly referred to as the most powerful ac-
tors in the criminal justice system,2 it is the police who have the initial
1 See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 324 (2016).
2 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009). Prosecutors are often portrayed as the villains of the criminal
justice system. For a recent example, see JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN 127–34 (2017). Not all
experts, however, believe that prosecutors are as powerful as the conventional wisdom suggests.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 835–838 (2018).
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power to change a person’s life by taking them to jail and starting the
machinery of criminal justice. And they do this a lot: each year, police
arrest about eleven million individuals.3
Even if we assume that most police officers are well inten-
tioned—which I do—they are not infallible in deciding whom to ar-
rest. Police receive very little legal training about their state’s criminal
code.4 And officers rarely consult with prosecutors at the moment of
arrest to ask whether it will be feasible to successfully prosecute the
individual who is being arrested.5 Put simply, police are offered little
guidance on arrests and must exercise their best judgment in deter-
mining whom to take into custody and whom to send on their way.
Although many police officers exercise their discretion quite well,
in the big picture there is reason to be concerned. Prosecutors dismiss
a huge number of cases with no conviction being entered.6 In many of
these cases, police officers did nothing wrong. For example, prosecu-
tors dismiss cases because key witnesses die, recant, or disappear.
They also cut deals in exchange for defendants testifying against other
individuals. In these types of cases, police error does not lead to the
dismissal of charges. But other dismissals do happen because of police
error: prosecutors drop charges because police arrested even though
there was no evidence to establish one of the elements of the offense,
or because the search was invalid or the confession violated Miranda
and the evidence will therefore be suppressed. Although specific num-
bers are hard to come by, we know that prosecutors dismiss cases be-
cause of clear police error.7 In other instances, police conduct proper
searches and arrests, but prosecutors dismiss the cases because of a
3 See FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016: ARRESTS 2
(2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/persons-arrest
ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8HF-BHFU]; FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2013: ARRESTS 2 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/
persons-arrested/arrestmain_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7FX-D7G4].
4 See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 103–09 (2011) (review-
ing studies showing that police academies spend only a few dozen hours teaching law).
5 See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Justice on the Line: Prosecutorial Screening Before
Arrest, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3037172 [https://perma.cc/EE6V-RENC].
6 See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEL-
ONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 24 (2013) (finding
that prosecutors dismiss twenty-five percent of felony charges). The rate is much higher in some
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55
STAN. L. REV. 29, 72–74 (2002); Bellin, supra note 2, at 10–11. R
7 Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) (collecting studies that estimate
the number of cases not prosecuted due to the exclusionary rule).
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sense that saddling an individual with a criminal conviction would be
unjust or unnecessary under the circumstances.8
In an overcrowded criminal justice system, prosecutors should
discourage police from making warrantless arrests that the prosecu-
tors will later dismiss outright. We do not want police to make
searches or conduct interrogations that will later be found to be inva-
lid. Jails are too overcrowded to house unnecessary arrestees. Prose-
cutors, defense attorneys, court clerks, and judges are too
overburdened to deal with cases that will be dropped. And, of course,
we should not want arrestees to suffer needless incarceration, expen-
sive bail bonds, embarrassing mug shots, possible job loss, and other
consequences of arrest if their cases will ultimately be dismissed out-
right without conviction.9
So, how do we help police officers to avoid making unnecessary
arrests? The most obvious possibility is increased training: more
courses in substantive criminal law and criminal procedure would cer-
tainly help officers to make better decisions on the street. Another
possibility—currently embraced by only a small number of jurisdic-
tions—would be to require police to obtain permission for warrantless
arrests from prosecutors prior to taking suspects to jail.10 The problem
with both of these proposals is that they are time consuming and
expensive.11
This Essay therefore offers a much less expensive approach: pros-
ecutors’ offices should adopt a formal policy requiring that prosecu-
tors notify the arresting police officer each time one of her warrantless
arrests is dismissed and the reason for the dismissal. If a case is dis-
missed because the prosecutor could not prove one of the elements of
the offense, the prosecutor should explain what evidence was lacking.
If the search was invalid, the prosecutor should provide a brief expla-
nation of what the officer should have done differently. If police of-
ficers receive these communications, then they will hopefully
recognize their errors and perform better in future cases. In short, dis-
missals should be teachable moments for police. Some prosecutors’
offices already explain to police why their cases were dismissed, but
8 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1254
(2011) (offering example of a prosecutor declining to bring charges against a homeless person
who was trespassing in a building during a snowstorm).
9 See Harmon, supra note 1, at 313–20. R
10 See generally Gershowitz, supra note 5 (exploring the Harris County model and docu- R
menting how rarely it is used in other counties).
11 While I acknowledge the enormous cost, I strongly endorse the prosecutorial-screening
approach utilized in a handful of jurisdictions. See id. at 14.
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the practice is far from universal. And in some jurisdictions, prosecu-
tors only notify the police about dismissals on an ad hoc basis, or only
in certain types of cases, or they provide notification without an expla-
nation of why the case was dismissed.
Additionally, prosecutors could use their dismissal notifications
to create a database that allows the prosecutor’s office to see which
officers are bringing in weak cases that are ultimately dismissed. Ag-
gregated data, in turn, would enable prosecutors to insist that police
departments provide additional training to certain officers on particu-
lar topics. A database would be a small step toward correcting the
moral-hazard problem that police face: police officers may be re-
warded by their departments for making arrests, but they are not held
to account when those cases turn out to be weak and have to be dis-
missed by prosecutors. Although prosecutors’ offices do not oversee
police departments, and thus lack the authority to discipline officers
who bring in weak cases,12 highlighting officers with frequent dismis-
sals would put pressure on police departments to reign in officers who
are wasting the time of other actors in the criminal justice system.13
Part I of this Essay briefly reviews police authority to conduct
warrantless arrests and input cases into the criminal justice system.
Part I explains how prosecutors rarely review cases at the moment of
arrest and typically only dig into the cases days or weeks later. Part II
then explains some of the reasons why prosecutors dismiss cases after
arrest. Part III then describes interviews with nearly twenty prosecu-
tors’ offices about how they communicate dismissal information to the
police. Part III demonstrates that some prosecutors’ offices are effec-
tively informing police officers about the dismissals, while other of-
fices are not doing so. Part IV then offers best practices for
prosecutors’ offices to adopt in using dismissals as teachable moments.
Finally, Part V explores the benefits and challenges of maintaining a
database that tracks police officers to identify the officers who bring in
weak cases that end in dismissals. In particular, Part V explores
whether such databases would create Brady material that prosecutors
would have to turn over to the defense.
12 See Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s Role, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591, 1644 (2014).
13 Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1609, 1626 (2012) (“One might think that prosecutors, who bear the costs of exclusion, would see
that police were trained to avoid violations in the first place or would insist that some mix of
incentives and discipline were put in place to assure police compliance. . . . But police and prose-
cutors often behave as though they work for different entities, rather than being the obvious
assembly line from street to prison that they are.”).
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I. POLICE AUTHORITY TO MAKE WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Most arrests in the United States are made without a warrant.14
Police have constitutional authority to arrest without a warrant so
long as there is probable cause and the officers are not entering a
home.15 Moreover, as numerous scholars have recognized, legislatures
have criminalized a huge number of offenses.16 And state legislatures
have made many crimes—even low-level misdemeanors—arrestable
offenses that enable the police to take people into custody.17 Accord-
ingly, police have enormous power to arrest individuals and to begin
the criminal justice process.
Of course, prosecutors ultimately decide which cases will move
forward with formal charges. But in many jurisdictions, prosecutors do
not become involved in warrantless arrests until the probable cause
hearing, which is often forty-eight hours after arrest.18 In a recent
study, I analyzed more than forty prosecutors’ offices around the
country and found that in most jurisdictions, prosecutors do not pro-
vide much guidance to police at the time of warrantless arrests.19
Many prosecutors’ offices maintain hotlines for police to call if the
officers have questions before making a warrantless arrest.20 But most
jurisdictions reported that calls are not mandatory and that police
tend to call only in high-profile cases or those that seem complicated
to the officers.21 In short, as a general matter across the United States,
it is rare for prosecutors to advise police about whether to make a
warrantless arrest or to release the suspect.
A police officer’s decision to arrest will trigger a huge litany of
consequences for the arrestee: incarceration, the need to post bail, in-
ternet-accessible arrest records, mug shots, immigration and housing
consequences because agencies track arrest records, the prospect of
job loss because of incarceration, and difficulty in finding new work
because of arrest records.22 An officer’s decision to arrest will also
14 See Harmon, supra note 1. R
15 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980).
16 For the most prominent exposition, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507, 513–17 (2001).
17 See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte
Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 466 (2002) (noting the “multitude of now arrestable low-level offenses
contained in federal, state, and local laws, and the acknowledged willingness of government ac-
tors to utilize minor legal offenses to serve broader law enforcement ends”).
18 See Gershowitz, supra note 5, at 5. R
19 See id. at 5–14.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–25 (2015).
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input a new case into an overburdened criminal justice system; in
many jurisdictions, prosecutors, public defenders, clerks, and judges
already have more cases than they can handle.23
Accordingly, for the good of the defendant and the criminal jus-
tice system, we should want police to exercise their arrest authority
wisely. This means arresting in cases that are good candidates for suc-
cessful prosecution, but releasing suspects when prosecutors will not
be able to prove an element of the offense or when convictions would
seem unjust. As explained below, police officers do not always exer-
cise their enormous authority in the same way that prosecutors would.
II. PROSECUTORS FREQUENTLY DISMISS CASES
WHERE POLICE ARRESTED
Prosecutors dismiss a huge number of cases with no conviction
being entered.24 For example, many charges are dismissed because the
prosecutor struck a plea deal with the defendant on other charges. In
these cases, the police did not err in making the arrest; the dismissal
was simply for efficiency or systemic reasons. In other cases, however,
prosecutors dismiss charges because police should not have made the
arrest in the first place. These “unnecessary arrests” are the ones that
this Essay is concerned with.
There are numerous types of “unnecessary arrests” that police
bring into the system. First, there are good faith errors. Police officers
are not legally trained25 and thus may not understand that prosecutors
will be unable to prove an element of the offense. For instance, each
year, thousands of Americans bring guns and other weapons to the
airport and attempt to take them through airport security.26 Police of-
ficers sometimes arrest the travelers without realizing how difficult it
is to prove guilt in such cases. To convict a defendant in some jurisdic-
tions, it is not enough for the prosecutor to show that the gun was in a
suitcase; instead the prosecutor must show that the traveler “reck-
23 See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261 (2011)
(describing excessive caseloads handled by prosecutors in large jurisdictions).
24 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
25 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
26 See Fredrick Kunkle, Opinion, Trump Aide Was Among Record Numbers Taking a Gun
Through TSA Checkpoint Last Year, Police Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2017/01/27/trump-aide-was-among-record-numbers-taking-a-
gun-through-tsa-checkpoint-last-year/?utm_term=.b1992b2a956c [https://perma.cc/C2G5-447P]
(noting that the TSA found more than 3,300 firearms in carry-on bags in 2016).
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lessly” brought it through security.27 Prosecutors know that it is diffi-
cult to show this mens rea because travelers can easily claim that they
were unaware the gun was in the bag and that they were simply negli-
gent. Accordingly, prosecutors often dismiss the charges.28
Second, police officers sometimes bring in cases that might be
termed “contempt of cop.” Officers arrest suspects for resisting ar-
rest—perhaps because the individual pulled his arms away when the
officer tried to handcuff him. Police also arrest for evading arrest—
perhaps because the suspect took a long time to pull over after the
officer activated her police siren. Once again, proving mens rea in
these cases is difficult.29 Thus, although police arrest on resisting and
evading charges with some frequency, prosecutors dismiss those
charges with some frequency.30
Third, police sometimes arrest individuals to clear a street corner,
to show a police presence in a tough neighborhood, or to gather evi-
dence or information.31 For example, New York City police officers
arrested 1,876 people for loitering over the span of a decade even
though a federal court had already struck down the loitering statute
and enjoined the City from relying on it.32 Perhaps police see good
practical reasons to arrest in these kinds of cases, but prosecutors reg-
ularly dismiss the cases.33
Fourth, and much more concerning, police sometimes make war-
rantless arrests for their own benefit. Police departments track arrest
statistics34 to prevent officers from ducking work and wasting their
shifts.35 Officers, therefore, might arrest an individual to improve their
arrest numbers. Worse yet, in some jurisdictions, because police of-
ficers are paid overtime for appearing in court, they have an incentive
27 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(5) (West 2011).
28 Interview with Ed McClees, Former Prosecutor, Harris Cty., Tex. (June 3, 2017).
29 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04 (West 2013) (requiring the prosecution to
prove an intentional mens rea).
30 Interview with Laura Killinger, Former Prosecutor, Harris County, Tex. (June 3, 2017).
31 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1332 (2012); see Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1695 (2010); Harmon, supra note 1, at 357. R
32 See Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 268, 275 (2015).
33 See Gershowitz, supra note 5, at 18–19. R
34 Cf. JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME 28 (2012)
(discussing some statistics collected about police officers).
35 In the infamous words of Detective Jimmy McNulty of The Wire, “We can lock a guy up
on a humble, we can lock him up for real, or we can . . . pull under the expressway and drink
ourselves to death, and our side partners will cover it. So no one—and I mean no one—tells us
how to waste our shift.” The Wire: Misgivings (HBO Nov. 19, 2006) (at 30:39).
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to make arrests that will lead to court pay.36 One prosecutor (who
wished to remain anonymous) explained that some police officers are
more prone to arrest if they think they will be paid overtime to testify
in court, even if the case is weak.37
Fifth, prosecutors dismiss cases as a matter of justice. In these
cases, police were not wrong, as a matter of law, to arrest the individ-
ual because all the elements of the offense were present and the sus-
pect violated the penal code. Nevertheless, the prosecutor might
decide it is not in society’s best interests for the individual to have a
criminal conviction. For instance, police are often called when a fight
breaks out between high-school students.38 Although it may be legally
permissible to charge one or both students with assault, prosecutors
sometimes look at the age of the suspects and their lack of a criminal
record and opt to dismiss the case.39 Similarly, when police arrest sus-
pects for low-level drug charges or possession of drug paraphernalia,
prosecutors will sometimes dismiss those cases as well.40 Put simply,
prosecutors sometimes see cases differently (and more leniently) than
police officers.41
The fourth and fifth categories—arrests to improve statistics and
arrests in cases that seem unjust—point to an inherent problem in the
design of the criminal justice system. Police officers are evaluated
based on their arrests; police departments do not award promotions or
raises based on the number of convictions that result from those ar-
rests.42 In other words, police supervisors look at police officers’ day-
36 See Alan Feuer & Joseph Goldstein, The Arrest Was a Bust. The Officers Got Overtime
Anyway, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/nyregion/new-york-
police-overtime-pay-trial.html [https://perma.cc/HM48-JE4P].
37 Interview with Anonymous Prosecutor from Midwestern County (July 13, 2017).
38 See, e.g., Sarah Gonzalez, How School Zero Tolerance Rules Turn Bad Behavior into a
Crime, STATEIMPACT FLA. (Feb. 25, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://perma.cc/JQ9E-T5DT.
39 See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of
Color, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 444 (2013).
40 See, e.g., Tony Briscoe, Cook County State’s Attorney Will Dismiss Minor Pot Cases,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 20, 2015, 7:52 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-drug-policy-reform-met-
20150419-story.html [https://perma.cc/4UKX-S5LE]; Brian Rogers, Harris County DA’s Easing
of Crack Pipe Policy Stirs Storm, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 8, 2009, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/article/Harris-County-DA-s-easing-of-crack-pipe-policy-1613537.php [https:/
/perma.cc/93TJ-NMJU].
41 See Jonathan Abel, Cops and Pleas: Police Officers’ Influence on Plea Bargaining, 126
YALE L.J. 1730, 1775 (2017) (“[P]olice and prosecutors may come to different values for a
case . . . because the two parts of the prosecution team may have different moral or cultural
views of culpability.”).
42 See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 13, at 1625 (“The evidence and the literature sug- R
gest that convictions are low on the list of things police are rewarded or punished for. Police care
about arrests, not convictions.”).
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to-day effectiveness when determining rewards, not whether their per-
formance results in convictions.43 This is the same moral-hazard prob-
lem that affects countless other areas of the public and private world,
most famously compensation for bankers.44 Because police do not
have to internalize the costs and consequences of overarresting, they
may face perverse incentives to arrest when they should instead re-
lease suspects on the street.
It is difficult to know how often the moral-hazard problem or
simple lack of knowledge of the law causes police to make wrongful or
unnecessary arrests. We know that prosecutors dismiss a huge number
of cases, but the studies done to date do not break down cases be-
tween dismissals as part of plea bargains and dismissals because of
police error. It is, therefore, impossible to know exactly how often
prosecutors dismiss charges because police brought in flawed cases.
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe the number of dismissals due
to what we might call police error or unjust arrests is substantial.
In a few jurisdictions in Texas, police cannot make warrantless
arrests on the street unless they call an intake hotline and first receive
permission from a prosecutor.45 In these jurisdictions, calls to the in-
take division are mandatory and prosecutors report rejecting a consid-
erable number of cases.46 For instance, a study of the intake system in
Harris County, Texas, estimated that prosecutors rejected about ten
percent of cases in which police officers sought charges.47 In El Paso
County, Texas, the percentage of cases in which prosecutors rejected
police requests for charges was even higher.48
In short, police arrest in more cases than prosecutors are willing
to charge. The amount of daylight between police and prosecutors
surely differs by jurisdiction. But across the board, there is room for
police to improve their arrest decisions. As the next Part explains,
some prosecutors can use dismissals as teachable moments to help po-
lice learn when to release, rather than arrest, suspects. However, the
43 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities
for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 60
(2010) (“Police departments also often reward arrests, regardless of whether they lead to prose-
cutions or convictions.”).
44 See, e.g., Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Lehman Brothers and the Persistence of Moral
Hazard, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:33 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091500943_pf.html [https://perma.cc/RES2-QK9N].
45 See Gershowitz, supra note 5, at 26–36. R
46 See DOTTIE CARMICHAEL ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF DIRECT ELECTRONIC
FILING IN CRIMINAL CASES 8 (2006).
47 See Gershowitz, supra note 5, at 33–34. R
48 See id.
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effectiveness of these communications varies by office, and some pros-
ecutors’ offices do not provide basic dismissal information to the
police.
III. DISMISSALS AS TEACHABLE MOMENTS FOR POLICE OFFICERS
The criminal justice system—to the extent you can call it a sys-
tem—suffers from a terrible information flow problem. Examples
abound: arrestees have to hire a private lawyer or decide to stick with
the public defender without knowing which lawyer is more capable;49
judges must decide whether to trust prosecutors and defense attorneys
without knowing how they comported themselves in other court-
rooms; and most prosecutors make plea bargain offers without know-
ing how crowded the jails are or understanding how long an inmate is
likely to spend in prison before being paroled.50
Worse yet, the lack of information causes actors to make bad de-
cisions. Consider what happens as a result of the information deficits
outlined above. Arrestees may fire their free appointed lawyer and
spend their life savings (and that of their families) to hire an inferior
retained attorney. Judges may trust the word of prosecutors without
realizing that those same lawyers have engaged in misconduct in the
courtroom down the hall.51 And prosecutors may make stiff plea bar-
gain offers without realizing the degree of overcrowding in a prison on
the other side of the state where the inmate will be incarcerated.52
Although it has received less attention, a similar information flow
problem exists between police and prosecutors—when prosecutors
dismiss some warrantless arrests, police may not learn that the cases
were dismissed or why they were dismissed. If we think of some dis-
missed cases as the results of wrongful or unnecessary arrests, we
should want the police to understand that they have made mistakes so
that they do not repeat them in the future. In this way, dismissals can
49 On the public’s lack of understanding of the machinations of the criminal justice system,
see Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911 (2006).
50 See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Prob-
lem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 49 nn.9–10 (2008) (describing why prosecutors do not take the re-
sources available to jails and prisons into account when deciding whether to offer a plea
bargain).
51 To combat this problem, I have suggested publicly shaming prosecutors whose cases are
reversed for misconduct. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming
Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059 (2009).
52 To ameliorate this problem, I have suggested that jails and prisons regularly notify pros-
ecutors of capacity and conditions. See generally Gershowitz, supra note 50. R
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be teachable moments, but only if prosecutors explain the dismissals,
and the reasons for them, to the police.
This Part describes the practices of nearly twenty prosecutors’ of-
fices in informing police about dismissals. Some prosecutors’ offices
explain all dismissals to the arresting officers. Other prosecutors’ of-
fices explain dismissals only in cases where the police officers made
apparent errors. Still other prosecutors’ offices inform the police of-
ficers of the dismissals but do not explain the reasons why the cases
were dismissed. And in some offices, prosecutors do not tell officers
that cases have been dismissed at all. In short, there is considerable
variation in how much information prosecutors communicate to the
police.
A. Notification and Explanation of Dismissals in Almost All Cases
Some prosecutors’ offices make a concerted effort to inform po-
lice officers when a case has been dismissed. For instance, a prosecu-
tor in Louisville, Kentucky, explained that
we would usually advise the officer as to why we recom-
mended no indictment or refused to present [the case to the
grand jury]. . . . Usually we like to treat these events as
“teachable moments” that allow us to educate an officer as
to how the case might have been better handled or
prepared.53
In Ventura County, California, prosecutors “give a reason for not fil-
ing a case in the first place, and if [they] filed the case but later dis-
missed it, [they] would say why.”54 In Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, the district attorney’s office does not “proceed with any
resolution on a case without letting the victim and the officers
know.”55 Similarly, in Denton County, Texas, the district attorney’s
office notifies the officers in every case in which they decline to file
charges and most cases (though perhaps not every single misde-
meanor) when charges are dismissed after filing.56 In Pima County,
Arizona, officers are usually present when prosecutors decline to
53 Email from Jeffrey Cooke, Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, Louisville Office of
the Commonwealth’s Attorney, to Elizabeth Lester-Abdalla (July 14, 2017, 10:38 AM) (on file
with author).
54 Email from Mike Frawley, Ventura Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester-
Abdalla (July 14, 2017, 11:15 AM) (on file with author).
55 Email from Mike Manko, Allegheny Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Adam Gershowitz
(July 13, 2017, 3:53 PM) (on file with author).
56 See Email from Jamie Beck, First Assistant Criminal Dist. Attorney, Denton Cty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester-Abdalla (July 17, 2017, 3:50 PM) (on file with author).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\86-6\GWN604.txt unknown Seq: 13 21-NOV-18 13:16
2018] PROSECUTORIAL DISMISSALS AS TEACHABLE MOMENTS 1537
move forward with a case (because cases are often rejected on the
cusp of presenting officer testimony to a grand jury), and when cases
are dismissed after indictment, a paralegal in the prosecutor’s office
will typically email the officer.57 The Fort Bend County District Attor-
ney’s Office in Texas goes further by having secretaries draft a memo
to the officers specifying the reasons for the dismissal.58
B. Notification in Some Cases
Other prosecutors’ offices notify the police about dismissals in
some, but not all, cases. A number of prosecutors’ offices appear to
focus their communication efforts on cases in which the officers have
made clear errors. For instance, in Shelby County, Tennessee, the dis-
trict attorney’s office does not have a policy on informing police about
case dismissals and generally does not inform the police about dismis-
sals.59 However, “if the case was dismissed because of a mistake that
the officer made, [they] try to let the officer know what the mistake
was and what he might do differently in the future.”60 In Los Angeles,
California, when a prosecutor dismisses a case she “would only tell
officers who have asked to be informed, or who are present in court
when the case is dismissed, or if the dismissal was necessitated by po-
lice error for which case-specific training is in order.”61 Prosecutors do
not inform all officers of dismissals “as matter of course.”62
Similarly, in Essex County, Massachusetts, prosecutors ordinarily
do not inform police officers about dismissals because in their view,
most dismissals are not because of police error.63 However, “[i]f there
is an egregious error by the officer and that is the reason for the dis-
missal ([for example, a] bad search warrant), then the [prosecutor]
would likely tell them.”64 A prosecutor in Fresno, California, offered a
similar explanation: “If there is a problem with the case” the prosecu-
tors “will routinely let the officer know so that the same mistakes are
57 See Telephone Interview with Amelia Cramer, Chief Deputy Pima Cty. Attorney (Aug.
10, 2017).
58 See Email from Wesley Wittig, Exec. Assistant Dist. Attorney, Fort Bend Cty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, to Adam Gershowitz (July 13, 2017, 4:12 PM) (on file with author).
59 Email from Alanda Dwyer, Office of Shelby Cty. Dist. Attorney Gen., to Adam Ger-
showitz (July 13, 2017, 5:05 PM) (on file with author).
60 Id.
61 Email from Devallis Rutledge, Special Counsel to the Dist. Attorney, L.A. Cty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, to Adam Gershowitz (July 13, 2017, 5:05 PM) (on file with author).
62 Id.
63 See Email from Carrie Kimball-Monahan, Essex Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Eliza-
beth Lester-Abdalla (July 25, 2017, 12:02 PM) (on file with author).
64 Id. According to an Essex County prosecutor, “[t]his doesn’t happen frequently.” Id.
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not made in the future.”65 Likewise, in New Haven, Connecticut, pros-
ecutors ordinarily do not notify police about dismissals, but “[t]here is
an informal practice where several prosecutors, but not all, do alert
police officers in the event an arrest is dismissed. This particularly ap-
plies to incidents related to motor vehicle stops and[]/or searches. The
prosecutors do this, in part, as a training mechanism.”66
Other prosecutors’ offices explained that communication with po-
lice officers might depend on whether the case was declined at the
outset or dismissed after charges had been filed. For instance, in Con-
tra Costa, California, police agencies bring in cases and request that
prosecutors file charges. If the prosecutors do not file charges, “the
agencies are notified that we declined to charge a case and the agen-
cies are given some general information as to why ([i.e.,] ‘insufficient
evidence’).”67 By contrast, for cases that prosecutors “do file but sub-
sequently dismiss, [prosecutors] do not generally inform the agencies
of the basis for the dismissal” because those cases are usually dis-
missed “in the interests of justice.”68
C. Variations in the Amount of Information Conveyed
For prosecutors’ offices that notify police about dismissals, the
amount of information provided to the officers varies considerably.
Some prosecutors’ offices typically, though not always, provide an ex-
planation for the dismissals. As noted above, in Fort Bend County,
Texas, the district attorney’s office sends the officers a memorandum
explaining the dismissal.69 Similarly, in Hennepin County, Minnesota
(home to Minneapolis), when prosecutors “close a case, including by
dismissal, [they] note the case disposition in [their] case management
system. That generates an email to the investigator telling him/her of
the disposition of their case. . . . Depending on the circumstances,
there may or may not be an explanation.”70 However, a senior attor-
ney in the Hennepin County office noted that prosecutors typically
65 Email from Steve Wright, Fresno Cty. Office of the Dist. Attorney, to Adam Ger-
showitz (July 24, 2017, 12:35 PM) (on file with author).
66 Email from Robert Sage, New Haven State’s Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester-
Abdalla (July 17, 2017, 9:12 AM) (on file with author).
67 Email from Brian Feinberg, Deputy Dist. Attorney, Contra Costa Cty. Dist. Attorney’s
Office, to Adam Gershowitz (July 13, 2017, 6:26 PM) (on file with author).
68 Id.
69 See Email from Wesley Wittig, Exec. Assistant Dist. Attorney, Fort Bend Cty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, to Adam Gershowitz (July 13, 2017, 4:12 PM) (on file with author).
70 Email from Alan Harris, Managing Assistant Hennepin Cty. Attorney, Hennepin Cty.
Attorney’s Office, to Adam Gershowitz (July 13, 2017, 6:02 PM) (on file with author).
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provide an explanation for the officers if their case was dismissed as
part of a plea bargain.71
Other jurisdictions inform the police about dismissals but do not
typically provide explanations of the reasons for dropping charges.
For instance, in Wayne County, Michigan (home to Detroit), prosecu-
tors will note in the file that is returned to the police that the case was
“dismissed because there is insufficient evidence to prosecute.”72
Wayne County prosecutors do not, however, specify the reason why
they are not proceeding with the case unless asked by the officer in
charge of the case.73
D. No Information from Prosecutors to Police About Dismissals
Finally, in some district attorney’s offices, prosecutors simply do
not tell police officers that a case has been dismissed. For example, in
Kern County, California, prosecutors do not inform police about dis-
missals “unless the officer specifically asks what happened.”74 In Nor-
folk, Massachusetts, prosecutors do not notify police about dismissals
and instead rely on the officers learning “indirectly, as they would no
longer be required to be a witness” or because other police depart-
ment employees sitting in court might notify the arresting officers.75
Similarly, representatives of district attorney’s offices in Essex
County, New Jersey,76 Lee County, Florida,77 and Salt Lake County,
Utah,78 explained that their prosecutors ordinarily do not inform po-
lice officers about case dismissals.
* * *
Although the responses of the eighteen offices described above
are a very small percentage of the 2,330 prosecutors’ offices in the
71 See id.
72 Email from Maria Miller, Wayne Cty. Assistant Prosecutor, to Adam Gershowitz (July
13, 2017, 7:51 PM) (on file with author).
73 See id.
74 Email from Mark Pafford, Kern Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester-
Abdalla (July 14, 2017, 11:01 AM) (on file with author).
75 Email from David Traub, Norfolk Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester-
Abdalla (July 21, 2017, 12:53 PM) (on file with author).
76 See Email from Katherine Carter, Pub. Info. Officer, Essex Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, to
Adam Gershowitz (July 13, 2017, 3:48 PM) (on file with author).
77 See Email from Kelly Worcester, Lee Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester-
Abdalla (July 17, 2017, 9:21 AM) (on file with author).
78 See Email from Blake Nakamura, Salt Lake Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Adam Ger-
showitz (July 14, 2017, 4:07 PM) (on file with author).
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United States,79 they demonstrate the wide variations between offices.
Some offices notify police officers about dismissals in all cases and try
to educate the police so that they can avoid errors in the future. Other
offices leave it to prosecutors’ discretion to decide which dismissals to
notify police about. Some prosecutors’ offices provide information to
police about particular types of cases, such as motor vehicle stops or
searches. Still other county prosecutors’ offices notify police officers
that cases were dismissed but do not provide explanations of the rea-
sons for the dismissals. And some prosecutors tell officers nothing
about dismissals.
Moreover, although prosecutors in some offices described the
value in having prosecutors educate police officers about dismissals,
most offices do not appear to have a formal policy requiring that pros-
ecutors transmit information to police officers. Rather, in many of the
prosecutors’ offices described above, it appears that prosecutors sim-
ply exercise their best judgment about when to talk with police about
case dismissals. For instance, a prosecutor in Louisville, Kentucky—an
office that strongly endorses using dismissals as “teachable moments”
for police—explained that “[t]here is no formal policy. The prosecutor
assigned to the case informs the officer and, depending on the case,
may give further information or suggestions.”80
IV. DESIGNING THE MOST EFFECTIVE DISMISSAL NOTICE
FOR POLICE OFFICERS
As described in Part III, prosecutors’ offices differ in whether and
how much they communicate with police officers about dismissals.
This Part briefly offers some best practices that prosecutors should
embrace.81
First, prosecutors’ offices should adopt a formal policy requiring
that the arresting officer be notified when any case is dismissed. Pros-
ecutors in many offices are extremely busy; often, some tasks have to
go undone, and the first thing to give way is usually a task that is not
mandatory. Even if a prosecutor knows it is a good idea to communi-
cate with police officers about dismissals—both to maintain good rela-
tions and to improve the officers’ performance—busy prosecutors
79 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007, at 1
(2011).
80 Email from Jeffrey Cooke to Elizabeth Lester-Abdalla, supra note 53. R
81 As Professor Rachel Harmon has explained, we typically think of the regulation of the
police as a judicial question involving constitutional criminal procedure. There are, however,
other methods that can effectively constrain and constructively shape police behavior. See gener-
ally Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761 (2012).
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might skip that task if it is only a suggested practice. Indeed, because
dismissals may upset some police officers, prosecutors have further
incentive to avoid these difficult conversations.
The best way to ensure that police are informed about dismissals
is to make it mandatory for prosecutors to inform them. Prosecutors’
offices already mandate such information flow to victims pursuant to
the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which provides federal crime victims
with a reasonable right to confer with the prosecutor.82 Many states
followed suit, either by constitutional amendment, statute, or internal
prosecutor’s office policy.83 Although it might be challenging to con-
vince legislatures to enact comparable legislation for informing police
officers, it would be wise for prosecutors to embrace mandatory office
policies of reporting dismissals to police officers.
Second, prosecutors should communicate dismissals to police of-
ficers in all cases, not simply those in which the police officer made a
clear error. As noted, some police officers become upset when prose-
cutors dismiss cases or refuse to file charges in the first place.84
Because police officers are repeat players in the system, there is a
natural temptation for prosecutors to avoid conflict with them.85 If a
prosecutor’s office only requires communication in cases of police “er-
ror,” there will be a temptation for prosecutors to conclude that dis-
missals were not for police error. Put differently, prosecutors might
quietly dismiss a case as “routine” rather than as “police error” to
avoid having a difficult or time-consuming conversation with the
officer.
Moreover, police officers can learn from prosecutors not only in
cases in which they committed overt error, but also in cases in which
they did not. The state criminal codes and Fourth Amendment doc-
trine are complicated. Even if the police officer did not commit a
82 For a discussion, see Elliot Smith, Is There a Pre-Charge Conferral Right in the CVRA?,
2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 407.
83 See Elizabeth N. Jones, The Ascending Role of Crime Victims in Plea-Bargaining and
Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 115 (2014) (“Another significant right permits victims to consult
with the prosecutor on their case.”); cf. John W. Stickels et al., Elected Texas District and County
Attorneys’ Perceptions of Crime Victim Involvement in Criminal Prosecutions, 14 TEX. WES-
LEYAN L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2007) (describing emphasis prosecutors place on satisfying victims).
84 See Abel, supra note 41, at 1738 (“Police put their lives on the line to investigate and R
arrest defendants, only to see prosecutors deal away the cases for some fraction of what they
could have received at trial. It is not hard to see why this might upset officers.”).
85 See id. at 1762 (“Police departments and district attorneys’ offices necessarily work to-
gether on many thousands of cases each year, and the chain of command on each side of the
prosecution team has a lot at stake in maintaining good working relations with their prosecution-
team colleagues.”).
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grievous error, she may learn something from the prosecutor that
could help her in a future arrest.
Third, in communicating dismissals, prosecutors should explain
the reasons for the dismissals. In some prosecutors’ offices, the com-
puter system is set up to simply send a report to the police officer that
a case was dismissed for “insufficient evidence.”86 But insufficient evi-
dence could mean multiple things. For example, if a witness recanted
or if the prosecutor digs into a case and finds that the witness’ criminal
history makes her unreliable or unpersuasive, the prosecutor might
believe a conviction is unlikely because of insufficient evidence; police
would likely learn little from this type of “insufficient evidence” dis-
missal. But in other cases, prosecutors might conclude that there is
simply not enough information to establish a required element of the
crime. Perhaps the statute has a stringent mens rea, or it requires
proof of a complicated element for which factual evidence is simply
missing; or perhaps the officers failed to collect all the key evidence.
Police officers could undoubtedly benefit from being informed of
these holes in the cases. Police see similar cases with regularity and
they might not arrest again in a weak case if they understood the rea-
son an earlier, similar case was dismissed.
Communicating the reason for the dismissal is important not just
in cases where elements of the offense are missing, but also when
prosecutors dismiss cases as a matter of justice. If police officers have
a better understanding of cases in which prosecutors will not move
forward, the officers can avoid bringing those “unjust” cases into the
criminal justice system in the first place.
Finally, for reasons described below in Part V, prosecutors should
communicate information about the dismissals in writing so that the
information can be aggregated into a database.
V. PROSECUTORS SHOULD CREATE A DATABASE OF OFFICERS
WHOSE CASES ARE DISMISSED
A. Benefits of a Dismissal Database
As described in Part IV, the criminal justice system would func-
tion better if prosecutors’ offices had a clear policy to notify arresting
officers each time one of their cases is dismissed and provide the rea-
sons for the dismissals. Using a computer system to make the notifica-
tions—rather than doing it only in person or by phone—would offer
another possible benefit: a computerized notification system would
86 See, e.g., Email from Maria Miller to Adam Gershowitz, supra note 72. R
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enable prosecutors to build a database and track the police officers
and precincts who bring in cases that are repeatedly dismissed.87
At present, prosecutors are likely aware of some “problem” of-
ficers who do a sloppy job writing police reports, arrest in questiona-
ble cases, or engage in problematic searches and interrogations. For
instance, as a senior prosecutor in Montgomery County, Texas
explained:
[O]ver time, we have individually learned that some officers
may occasionally need additional assistance with presenting
their cases or with determining appropriate charges. We then
try to work with those officers, perhaps with a little extra
attention. In a few rare cases, we may contact the officer[’]s
supervisor if persistent or pronounced problems in this area
continue to occur.88
Logically, prosecutors in smaller jurisdictions are more aware of prob-
lem officers, simply because there are not as many police officers to
keep track of.89 These smaller jurisdictions would likely see only a
modest benefit from maintaining a database of officers whose cases
are dismissed because of police error.90
Large and medium-sized jurisdictions, however, are a very differ-
ent story. Medium-sized prosecutors’ offices that serve communities
of 250,000 to 1,000,000 people typically have roughly fifty prosecu-
tors.91 Large prosecutors’ offices that serve counties of more than
1,000,000 people will have roughly 200 (and in some offices as many as
87 On the rise, benefits, and fallibility of criminal justice data collection, see Wayne A.
Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541
(2016). While this Essay focuses on the benefits of a database of police errors, that is not to say
we should not also track prosecutorial behavior as well. See Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics,
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771 (2017) (advocating data collection involving, inter alia, prosecutorial
action during jury selection and charging).
88 Email from Mike Holley, First Assistant Dist. Attorney, Montgomery Cty. Dist. Attor-
ney’s Office, to Adam Gershowitz (July 13, 2017, 4:07 PM) (on file with author).
89 About half of police departments in the United States have ten officers or fewer. BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 3 (2015) [hereinafter BJS, LOCAL POLICE DEP’TS]. And over 70% of prosecutor’s
offices serve districts with populations of fewer than 100,000 people. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, supra note 79, at 3 tbl.3. R
90 Because turnover in prosecutors’ offices is fairly high, a database might prove somewhat
useful to junior prosecutors in jurisdictions of any size who do not yet have the lay of the land.
But logic dictates that databases in small communities are not likely to be a panacea to improve
police practices.
91 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 79, at 4 tbl.2 (showing that this figure R
includes, on average, one chief prosecutor, forty-three assistant prosecutors, seven supervisory
attorneys, and three managing attorneys).
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1,000) prosecutors.92 These prosecutors will be working with hun-
dreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of officers.93 Indeed, in
some large counties, prosecutors work with dozens of different police,
constable, sheriff’s, and other law enforcement agencies. In Los Ange-
les, California, for example, the district attorney’s office interfaces
with nearly one hundred different law enforcement agencies.94
In medium and large jurisdictions, prosecutors cannot possibly
have enough interaction with the hundreds or thousands of police of-
ficers to know which officers regularly bring in cases that will be dis-
missed and which officers are in most need of training. Of course,
there will be hallway gossip among prosecutors about “who to be
careful of” but such talk will not reach all prosecutors and it will be
underinclusive in identifying the problem officers. In short, many
prosecutors will not learn of numerous problem officers.
A database that tracks dismissals by individual officers would fill
the information gap and would serve multiple functions. First, and
most obviously, a database could signal that individual officers are
problematic and in need of remedial training or discipline. Imagine,
for example, that at the end of the calendar year, prosecutors see that
a handful of officers had particularly high numbers of arrests that
were dismissed for insufficient evidence. The prosecutor’s office could
report this to the police department and strongly encourage increased
training.
Second, a database might show that a particular precinct in the
police department is performing poorly compared with the depart-
ment as a whole. Perhaps there is a culture in that precinct that en-
courages high numbers of arrests, even in weak cases.95 If the
prosecutor’s office presented this data to the police chief and ex-
pressed displeasure that the precinct was wasting the valuable time of
92 See id. (accounting for an average of 1 chief prosecutor, 187 assistant prosecutors, 31
supervisory attorneys, and 13 managing attorneys); Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 23, at 268 R
tbl.1 (listing the number of prosecutors in large district attorneys’ offices).
93 Only 5.3% of police departments in the United States have more than 100 officers, but
those departments employ 62.8% of full-time officers. See BJS, LOCAL POLICE DEP’TS, supra
note 89, at 3. New York City alone employs more than 34,000 full-time police officers. See id. at 3 R
tbl.2.
94 See Email from Devallis Rutledge, Special Counsel to the L.A. Dist. Attorney, to Adam
Gershowitz (May 17, 2017, 2:10 PM) (on file with author).
95 See, e.g., Ford Fessenden & David Rohde, Dismissed Before Reaching Court, Flawed
Arrests Rise in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at A1, B6 (“In the two police precincts that
make up Washington Heights, Inwood and northern Harlem, prosecutors threw out 120 of the
2,035 arrests—a rate, 5.9 percent, that is about twice as high as in the rest of Manhattan during
that period.”).
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the prosecutor’s office, the police chief might reassign precinct com-
manders and attempt to replace the management of the problematic
precinct.96
Third, a database might signal that some officers, some precincts,
or even an entire police department has a poor understanding of the
legal elements of a particular crime. For example, many states
criminalize being a felon in possession of a firearm.97 However, in
some states—Texas is a good example—the definition of who qualifies
as a felon for purposes of the statute is complicated, and police of-
ficers sometimes wrongfully arrest people who are not technically
felons under the definition in the statute.98 A database that tracks dis-
missals might show that certain officers (or entire precincts or depart-
ments) are misunderstanding sections of the penal code.
Similarly, a database might indicate that prosecutors across the
office are dismissing a particular type of case, not because police mis-
understood the law, but because the prosecutors think convictions are
not merited as a matter of justice. As noted above, police officers
sometimes arrest high school students for fighting on school grounds,
and prosecutors sometimes dismiss those cases because they do not
believe the teenagers should be saddled with criminal convictions.99
Prosecutors also sometimes dismiss low-level drug charges or posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia charges, even though police officers cor-
rectly recognized that all the elements of the crime were present.100 A
database of charges dismissed “as a matter of justice” would help po-
lice officers to learn when to exercise their authority to arrest and
when to release suspects on the street. For example, if police officers
learn that prosecutors regularly dismiss cases involving possession of
96 Police departments sometimes make changes to senior police management to remedy
problems within the department. See, e.g., Al Baker, Shake-Up in Hierarchy of the New York
Police Department, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/nyregion/
new-york-police-department-nypd-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/9ND4-YUN4]; David Cruz,
Shakeup at Newark Police Department Returns Former Director to Old Post, NJTV NEWS (Dec.
21, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.njtvonline.org/news/video/shakeup-at-newark-police-depart
ment-returns-former-director-to-old-post/ [https://perma.cc/FGR8-MHFD]; Naheed Rajwani,
Dallas Chief’s Decision to Demote Top Brass Shocks Rank-and-File Police, DALL. NEWS (Nov.
30, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas-police/2017/11/30/police-chief-de
motes-top-brass-major-shakeup-dallas-command-staff [https://perma.cc/FZH5-QK7C].
97 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224f (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 166.270 (West 2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (West 2009).
98 See, e.g., Ramon v. State, No. 13-15-00146-CR, 2016 WL 3364979 (Tex. App. June 16,
2016).
99 See, e.g., supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. R
100 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. R
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drug paraphernalia, the officers might choose not to arrest the next
person they find in possession of a crack pipe.
In sum, a database of dismissals should help police departments
to identify (1) problem officers in need of training or discipline;
(2) precincts that are performing poorly relative to the rest of the de-
partment; (3) deficits in officers’ understanding of particular crimes;
and (4) crimes that prosecutors dismiss out of a sense of justice and
for which the officers should be reluctant to make arrests.
Despite these benefits, however, it appears prosecutors do not
maintain dismissal databases. Not a single one of the eighteen prose-
cutors’ offices interviewed for this Essay maintains a list or database
of officers whose cases had been dismissed.
B. The Brady Concern
One reason that prosecutors may not carefully track and docu-
ment dismissals is that it is time consuming and logistically challeng-
ing. This rationale is not particularly persuasive, however, because
prosecutors must file paperwork to decline or dismiss charges. Moreo-
ver, many large and medium-sized prosecutors’ offices have sophisti-
cated computer systems for managing charges and dockets. Creating a
database that tracks dismissals and officers should not be complicated.
A more logical reason that prosecutors may not want to compile
a database of officers whose cases have been dismissed is the concern
that it might be discoverable. The Brady doctrine requires prosecutors
to disclose to the defendant any favorable and material evidence
known to prosecutors or the police.101 Favorable evidence includes
that which is exculpatory or which impeaches.102 To be material, there
must be a reasonable probability that the evidence would change the
outcome as to guilt or punishment.103 Prosecutors cannot avoid Brady
obligations by sticking their heads in the sand. In Kyles v. Whitley,104
the Supreme Court imposed a duty on trial prosecutors to learn of
favorable evidence in possession of other prosecutors or the police.105
A database of officers whose cases are frequently dismissed
would not be exculpatory evidence, but some of the database entries
101 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–89 (1963).
102 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
103 See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady
v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 649 (2002). The Court has not been particularly gener-
ous as to what constitutes materiality. Id. at 645.
104 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
105 See id. at 437.
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might be considered impeachment evidence. For instance, if a police
officer will testify in a defendant’s trial, a database listing dishonest
behavior by the officer in previous cases would be favorable to the
defendant because it could be useful for impeachment.
Surprisingly, the scope of impeachment evidence remains some-
what unchartered territory more than fifty years after the initial Brady
decision. As Jonathan Abel recently explained, the Supreme Court
has never decided whether the Brady doctrine applies to police per-
sonnel files.106 Lower federal courts have not clearly answered the
question,107 and state courts are all over the map.108 The situation is
complicated because in some states—California is a good example—
statutes provide that personnel records are confidential and shall not
be disclosed in criminal or civil proceedings, subject to limited
exceptions.109
A database of police officers whose cases have been frequently
dismissed is not a classic item for a personnel file. It is not a discipli-
nary write-up or an internal affairs investigation. At most, it might be
construed as a performance evaluation, but even that is uncertain. A
simple list of dismissals, without more, implies that the officer has per-
formed poorly, but it does not explicitly state as such. Moreover, the
database would not be in an officer’s personnel file, but instead would
be a standalone document. All of which suggests that it would likely
be more accessible to prosecutors, less confidential, and thus more
likely to fall within the Brady doctrine. As such, an argument that a
dismissal database should enjoy blanket exemption from Brady disclo-
sure would be weak.
However, just because a database of dismissals would not be ex-
empt from the Brady doctrine, does not mean that prosecutors would
necessarily have to turn over database entries in all or even most
cases. To fall within Brady, the database entries must contain im-
peachment evidence for the particular officer in question. Many
database entries about officers, however, would not constitute im-
peachment evidence. For example, imagine the database included the
following dismissal categories:
(1) Case dismissed for insufficient evidence to prosecute for
[Crime X].
106 See Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files
and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 751 (2015).
107 Cf. id. at 757–58 (describing an unresolved circuit split on this issue).
108 See id. at 762–79.
109 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (West 2008).
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(2) Case dismissed because the officer misunderstood the ele-
ments required to prove [Crime X].
(3) Case dismissed in the interest of justice.
(4) Case dismissed because the search may not satisfy Fourth
Amendment requirements.
(5) Case dismissed because of police misconduct, specifically
[explanation].
If the prosecutor’s office generated a document showing the number
of cases Officer Smith had dismissed for each category, none of the
information in categories one through four would be impeachment.
None of those categories indicates, on its face, that Officer Smith lied
or that his credibility is in question. The data does not indicate that he
planted, hid, or otherwise mishandled evidence. Categories one
through four indicate that Officer Smith did not have a good under-
standing of the evidence necessary to secure a conviction, the prosecu-
tors’ policies for exercising their discretion as a matter of justice, and
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Of course, we could speculate that Officer Smith knew the ele-
ments of the crimes were not met and chose to arrest anyway, or that
Officer Smith purposefully violated the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.
If true, that would be impeachment evidence that reflects on the of-
ficer’s honesty.110 But those conclusions are mere speculation and
would not be present in the dismissal database. The Brady doctrine
does not require prosecutors to go on a fishing expedition to ferret out
impeachment evidence based on speculation.111 Put differently, a de-
fendant’s hope that an officer’s prior cases were dismissed for nefari-
ous conduct rather than lack of legal knowledge of the criminal code
or the Fourth or Fifth Amendment should not trigger a Brady
obligation.
To the extent that any cases are dismissed because of police mis-
conduct, that, of course, would be quite different. If a prosecutor
knows or should know that a police officer has previously engaged in
misconduct leading to the dismissal of criminal charges, that would
110 See, e.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1015–16, 1020–22 app. (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing
conviction in part based on officer’s history of Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations).
111 See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5:25 (Thompson Reuters
2017–18) (reviewing various types of obligations imposed on prosecutors by the Brady doctrine
but noting that “a defendant has no right to embark on an investigative fishing expedition of
everything in the prosecutor’s possession or control in the hope that something useful might turn
up”).
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constitute impeachment evidence that the prosecutor would have to
disclose to the defense.112
The possibility of police misconduct cases may be enough to deter
some prosecutor’s offices from creating any type of dismissal
database. But it should not be: prosecutors’ offices should want to
identify “Brady cops”—those who will be unable to testify due to
prior misconduct—as early as possible so that those officers do not
taint future cases and cause appellate problems for years to come.113
Moreover, prosecutors will almost certainly be aware (or should have
been aware) of some of these “Brady cops” already and thus would
have had Brady obligations even in the absence of a dismissal
database.114 Additionally, many courts do not require that Brady evi-
dence be turned over until the eve of trial, at which point most cases
will already have pleaded or been dismissed.115 Indeed, in United
States v. Ruiz,116 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that defend-
ants could waive their right to receive impeachment material as part
of a guilty plea.117 In short, a dismissal database would likely create
only a small number of new Brady obligations. Moreover, the infor-
mation would already be in the database, making it easy for the prose-
cutor to turn it over. Although the burden on prosecutors would be
minimal, the potential benefit to defendants would be substantial, and
it would serve the interests of justice for prosecutors to share this in-
formation expeditiously.
Finally, the cost-benefit analysis should favor the dismissal
database even if it occasionally creates Brady material. If a dismissal
database leads to better police training and, as a result, officers bring-
ing in fewer weak cases, that benefit should outweigh the cost of creat-
ing a Brady record in a small number of cases.118
112 Milke, 711 F.3d at 1017. This would be particularly clear if the information were in a
standalone database, rather than in the officer’s personnel file.
113 See Abel, supra note 106, at 746 (explaining that Brady cops “cannot make arrests, R
investigate cases, or conduct any other police work that might lead to the witness stand. Such
officers would be well advised to start looking for a new profession.”).
114 See supra Section V.A.
115 See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2015).
116 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
117 Id. at 633 (“[T]he Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material
impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”).
118 The existing Brady jurisprudence does a poor job of incentivizing Brady disclosures and
of holding prosecutors responsible for violations. See, e.g., Jason Kreag, The Jury’s Brady Right,
98 B.U. L. REV. 345, 383 (2018) (advocating for increased prosecutorial disclosure, inter alia,
through the elimination of the materiality prong). Accordingly, a dismissal database may have
the additional benefit of signaling more clearly to prosecutors the need to be on the lookout for
Brady material and to disclose it.
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CONCLUSION
Police officers have enormous power in the American criminal
justice system. A police officer’s decision to arrest leads to an arrest
record, a mug shot, incarceration pending bail, the need to post
money for release, and a paper trail that may influence employment,
housing, deportation, and job prospects down the road. Even assum-
ing most police officers are well intentioned, the reality is that they
receive little formal legal training and do not typically consult with
prosecutors about the initial decision to make a warrantless arrest.
The best hope for police officers to make good arrest decisions is for
them to understand how prosecutors eventually resolve cases after ar-
rest. If prosecutors dismiss cases—for lack of evidence or out of a
sense of justice—then police officers should know about the dismissals
and the reasons in order to more effectively police their next shifts.
In some jurisdictions, prosecutors use dismissals as “teachable
moments” and inform police officers about all dismissals. Other pros-
ecutors’ offices communicate dismissal information to police officers
only when the officers have made clear errors. Still other prosecutors’
offices provide little or no information about dismissals and put the
onus on the officers to inquire why their cases were dismissed.
Prosecutors’ offices should establish formal policies mandating
that prosecutors inform police officers that their cases were dismissed
and of the reasons for dropping charges. Requiring communication in
all cases will educate police officers about the elements of crimes in
the penal code, the realities about which cases are difficult for prose-
cutors to prove, as well as the formal charging policies and informal
practices of the prosecutor’s office. This information will enable police
officers to better decide when to make warrantless arrests, and it
should reduce the number of weak cases brought into the criminal
justice system. Reducing inputs will benefit overburdened prosecu-
tors, public defenders, judges, and court staff by enabling them to
spend more time on cases that will not be outright dismissed. And, of
course, having police avoid unnecessary arrests will benefit defendants
by avoiding needless incarceration and the cascade of other repercus-
sions that follow an arrest.
A formal policy of notifying police officers of all dismissals will
also enable prosecutors’ offices to build a database. In medium- and
large-sized offices—where it is impossible for prosecutors to know
every police officer—a database will identify problem officers who are
repeatedly bringing in weak cases. Prosecutors can then recommend
that police departments provide further training to those officers. A
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\86-6\GWN604.txt unknown Seq: 27 21-NOV-18 13:16
2018] PROSECUTORIAL DISMISSALS AS TEACHABLE MOMENTS 1551
database might also make a dent in the moral-hazard problem of po-
lice being judged only on their arrests rather than case resolutions.
Finally, a database that primarily documents inadvertent police charg-
ing errors will, for the most part, not create impeachment evidence
that would have to be disclosed under the Brady doctrine.
In the vast majority of cases, warrantless arrests are the first step
in the criminal justice process. Prosecutors should arm police with the
best information so that the officers avoid as many incorrect or ill-
advised arrests as possible. Sharing information about dismissals will
help the officers to exercise their enormous authority more wisely.
